╓anafi School has a comprehensive and internally coherent legal theory the most important characteristic of which is the use of the general principles of law. The School also developed a system of 'precedents' and, for that purpose, the grading of jurists and manuals of law which help in resolving analytical inconsistencies and resultant in a smooth functioning of the system. The jurists of the School have occasionally differed, but the disagreement has always remained at the level of 'interpretation of facts' and not at the level of 'legislative presumptions' of the School. It is these latter principles -the legislative presumptions -which determine the core legal theory of the School and give it a peculiar flavor.
school. These are definitive for the school as "evidence cannot be led by the jurists of the school to refute these rules". 8 Thus, for instance, the ╓anafi School presumes: "Each time a ╒ukm is discovered through the opinion of a Companion it is said to be proved", 9 i.e., it is said to be the ╒ukm of Allah. 10 The jurists of the School have to presume this and they cannot challenge this presumption. If they do, they do not remain ╓anafis. 11 This explains the nature of the disagreements among the jurists of the school. They may have disagreed on the "interpretation of facts" (qaw┐'id fiqhiyyah), but they certainly did not disagree on the legislative presumptions. This will be explained more detail in Section 1.4 below. Some of the legislative presumptions of a school relates to the so-called "sources of law". For instance, as opposed to the M┐liki School, the ╓anafi School did not deem the "practice of the people of Madinah" as a valid source of law. 12 Similarly, contrary to the position of the Sh┐fi'i School, the ╓anafi School does not deem isti╖╒┐b valid for creating a new right even if it accepts it for the continued existence of the already established rights. 13 Other legislative presumptions relate to the "principles of interpretation", such as the following principles of the ╓anafi School:
Each time a command (amr) is found in the texts it conveys an obligation, unless another evidence indicates the contrary; Each time a ╒ukm is expressed in general terms it applies to all its categories with certainty, unless restricted by equally strong evidence;
The ╒ukm is found through the persuasive power of the evidence and not through the number of the evidence. 14 Nyazee points out that it is these legislative presumptions which determine the true color of a school and distinguishes it from other schools:
The first set of rules or presumptions are what are called u╖┴l al-fiqh. These are rules that determine the character of the school and identify its methodology. They are rules that elaborate the "theory of law" of the school. It is for this reason that there is unanimity about these rules, or at least about the most important rules in the entire set. Where there is a disagreement about any in this sense, it has to be a minor or less important rule. In this sense, the whole set consists of rules that are irrebuttable, that is, evidence cannot be led by the jurists of the school to refute these rules. 15 This point will be further elaborated below:
The Characteristic Flavor of the ╓anafi School:
As noted earlier, the ╓anafi School developed a "theory of general principles" for deriving and extending the rules of Islamic law. Nyazee expounds the ╓anafi theory in the following words:
The first task for the ╓anafi jurist, when he is faced with a new case, is to see whether this case can be accommodated under a general principle. If the case is covered directly by a principle, the jurist finds no difficulty in assigning to it the ╒ukm of the governing principle. If the case does not fall under one principle, the jurist would try to accommodate it under another principle. A principle that governs a case may itself be a sub-principle of a wider principle, or even be an exemption from it or a corollary. 16 As to where these principles are found, Nyazee explains that some of the principles are explicitly laid down in the texts of the Qur'┐n or the Sunnah, while others are derived from the already settled cases. In the latter case, the jurist may derive a principle for the first time, or it may have been derived already by an earlier jurist and the school deems it binding on the later jurists. 17 The derived principle is not equal in strength to the one explicitly stated in the texts, but it may be strengthened by other evidences, such as the opinion of a Companion or the tacit consensus of the Companions. 18 The "main features" of the ╓anafi methodology, according to Nyazee, can be summed up in the following points: 19 1. The definitive nature of the general word ('┐mm); 20 2. The use of the general principle as the starting point of all legal reasoning; 21 3. The opinion of a Companion as a binding precedent that not only governs the meaning of the Sunnah but also gives strength to a derived principle of law; 22 4. Tacit consensus of the Companions as a strengthening evidence for a derived principle of law; 23 and 5. The non-acceptance of the apparent meaning of a khabar w┐╒id if it clashes with an established principle of law, which it cannot restrict. 24 Nyazee further points out that the use of the general principles enhanced the analytical consistency of the system and resulted in rapid development of the law. However, this also necessitated the "warding off or evading the effect of the traditions" which were not consistent with the general principles. 25 Thus, traditions with weaker or disconnected chains, such as mursal traditions, were deemed acceptable if they were consistent with the general principles and traditions with sound chains were made subservient to these principles. 26 How do the ╓anafi jurists ensure analytical consistency in the system by reconciling between the apparently conflicting texts and principles? The answer to this question highlights the true worth of the ╓anafi methodology.
Ensuring Analytical Consistency in the System:
One important tool developed by the ╓anafi School for ensuring analytical consistency in the system is isti╒s┐n. 27 The point emphasized here is that this concept has generally been misunderstood; so much so that the ╓anafis were specifically charged for abandoning Divine law and creating rules on the basis of personal whims and caprices. 28 This was one of the reasons why they were termed as ahly al-ra'y as distinguished from the ahl al-╒ad┘th. 29 Another significant feature of the ╓anafi methodology for ensuring analytical consistency in the system was the way they resolved conflicts in the various evidences ('adillah) of law. 30 Some of the later jurists assert that in case of conflicting evidences, the ╓anafi School first opts for abrogation (naskh), failing which it goes for preference (tarj┘╒) and finally it tries reconciliation (jam'). 31 This view has generally been accepted by the modern scholars. 32 However, a thorough review of the classical manuals of the ╓anafi School, both on legal theory (u╖┴l al-fiqh) as well as settled law (fiqh), reveals that this view does not accurately represent the ╓anafi methodology for resolving conflicts. 33 The ╓anafi School, instead, first determines the grading and strength of the conflicting evidences; then, it derives a general principle from the superior evidence; after this, it interprets the subordinate evidence in the light of the superior evidence; if that is not possible, it presumes that the superior evidence has abrogated the subordinate evidence; if no evidence of abrogation is available, it abandons the subordinate evidence presuming that the narrator may have committed a mistake in understanding or narrating this evidence. A summary of the ╓anafi methodology as expounded by Sarakhsi is given here. The first significant point Sarakhsi makes is that conflict exists only if the two evidences are equal in status and negate each other. 34 In case of an apparent conflict between two verses of the Qur'┐n, the first thing the ╓anafis do is to find a way out (makhla╖) in the verses themselves. 35 If that is not possible, distinction has to be made between the rules of the two verses. 36 If that is also not possible, one rule is applied to one situation and the other to another. 37 If these three options are exhausted and the conflict is not resolved, this is the case of the "conflict proper" and it is here that the ╓anafis go for the option of abrogation. 38 If no direct or indirect evidence of abrogation 39 can be found, the ╓anafis hold that the two evidences negate each other and one has to look for another source to find the law. 40 A question arises here about preference. When the ╓anafis prefer one of the evidences to the other, do they abandon the latter as they do in case of abrogation? Sarakhsi answers in negative. 41 By preference, the ╓anafis only mean that the issue is governed by the preferred evidence and that the other evidence will be interpreted in the light of the preferred evidence. 42 
The Nature of Disagreements within the School:
Many contemporary scholars highlight the differences among the jurists of the ╓anafi School, particularly the Great Imam and his Two Disciples, on the rulings about the various sets of facts in order to prove that the practice of taql┘d -which these scholars criticize -was developed quite late, and that the founding Fathers of the School did not deem it necessary. In this section, the work of a great scholar will be critically evaluated who has thoroughly examined the u╖┴l as well as fiqh of the ╓anafi School and has then concluded that Shayb┐ni, the disciple of Ab┴ ╓an┘fah, was a mujtahid mu═laq in his own right, and that he followed Ab┴ ╓an┘fah neither in u╖┴l nor in fiqh. Mu╒ammad al-Das┴qi wrote his PhD dissertation on al-Im┐m Mu╒ammad bin al-╓asan al-Shayb┐ni wa Atharuhu fi al-Fiqh al-Isl┐mi. It was later published and translated into many languages, including Urdu. 43 Das┴qi devoted Section One of Chapter Three for proving the above contention, and tried to show that Shayb┐ni had a separate and distinct set of principles and hence a separate and distinct theory. 44 Although Das┴qi has tried to make a long list of such "distinct" principles of Shayb┐ni, most of them relate to minor issues and they can be easily reconciled with the major ╓anafi theory. Three issues, however, need some consideration: the authenticity of the mursal traditions, consensus of a later generation after disagreement of the earlier generation and conflict between a general word and a specific word. Das┴qi quotes Sh┐fi'i who ascribes an important principle to Shayb┐ni which, if proved definitively, makes Shayb┐ni's theory distinct from that of the ╓anafi School, namely that Shayb┐ni did not deem the mursal traditions as valid, particularly those of Mu╒ammad Ibn Shih┐b al-Zuhri. 45 However, Das┴qi does not deem this report authentic and shows that Shayb┐ni did use mursal reports and accepted the mursal reports of al-Zuhri. 46 The second important issue highlighted by Das┴qi relates to the binding nature of the consensus of a later generation when the earlier generation had disagreed on an issue. Das┴qi asserts that Ab┴ ╓an┘fah and Ab┴Y┴suf are of the opinion that disagreement of the earlier generation cannot be eliminated by the consensus of the later generation, while Shayb┐ni holds the opposite view. 47 Das┴qi cites the example of the validity of the sale of umm al-walad. 48 The Companions of the Prophet (peace be on him) disagreed on the validity of this transaction, but the Followers of the Companions reached a consensus on disallowing it. 49 As Ab┴ ╓an┘fah and Ab┴ Y┴suf enforce the decision of the judge about the validity of such a transaction and Shayb┐ni disagrees with them. Das┴qi infers from this that Ab┴ ╓an┘fah and Ab┴ Y┴suf did not deem it a valid consensus while Shayb┐ni deemed it so. 50 It seems that, in his eagerness to prove Shayb┐ni as a Mujtahid Mu═laq, Das┴qi has oversimplified the issue. As Sarakhsi asserts, there is no disagreement in these three giants on this issue; all of them deem the consensus of the later generation after disagreement of the earlier generation valid and binding. However, Ab┴ ╓an┘fah and Ab┴ Y┴suf deem the disagreement of the earlier generation as a shubhah (mistake of fact or law) because of which they enforce the decision of the judge regarding the validity of such transaction. 51 Hence, it was a disagreement on the interpretation of facts (q┐'idah fiqhiyyah), not on the legislative presumptions (q┐'idah u╖┴liyyah). Among the hundreds of principles of interpretation, Das┴qi could find only one principle on which, in his opinion, Shayb┐ni differed with the position generally held by the School. This is the case of conflict between '┐mm (general) and kh┐╖╖ (specific). 52 In this case, the ╓anafi School generally deems a general text as equal to a specific text. 53 Das┴qi cites two examples to prove that Shayb┐ni preferred the specific to the general. One issue is the conflict of the general command of keeping away from urine 54 with the specific command given to the people of the tribe of 'Uraynah to drink the urine of camels. 55 As the ╓anafis generally hold the urine of the camels as najas (ritually unclean), and Shayb┐ni does not deem it so, Das┴qi infers that Shayb┐ni, like the Sh┐fi'is, held that the second narration specified the first one while the ╓anafis prefer the first one because of its being general. 56 This is, however, not acceptable because in Sarakhsi has cited many cases from the texts of Shayb┐ni which definitely prove that Shayb┐ni, like Ab┴ ╓an┘fah, deems the general and the specific equal in status. 57 How then has Shayb┐ni disagreed with Ab┴ ╓an┘fah on the issue of the urine of camels? Sarakhsi explains this case in Mabsut and states that the reason for Shayb┐ni's disagreement with Ab┴ ╓an┘fah was that he saw no conflict in the two texts. 58 The other example given by Das┴qi is of the apparent conflict in two narrations about the zak┐h imposed on agricultural produce. 59 One of the traditions is general, prescribing no ni╖┐b for such produce, 60 while the other specifically prescribes the ni╖┐b as 5 awsuq. 61 Ab┴ ╓an┘fah interprets this latter tradition as referring to the zak┐h of trade, not agricultural produce, as traders used to sell and buy through wasaq. Shayb┐ni and Ab┴ Y┴suf disagree with him saying that the tradition prescribes ni╖┐b for the zak┐h of agricultural produce. Here again, Sarakhsi explains the position of Shayb┐ni and Ab┴ Y┴suf without in any way linking it to the conflict of the general and the specific. 62 Interestingly Ab┴ Y┴suf shares the view of Shayb┐ni in the case while no one says that he preferred the specific to the general. The conclusion, then, is that Shayb┐ni, like Ab┴ ╓an┘fah and Ab┴ Y┴suf, equated the general and the specific, as definitely proved by the cases referred to by Sarakhsi in his U╖┴l. In the two apparently deviant cases, Shayb┐ni preferred one tradition to the other for other reasons, as elaborated by Sarakhsi in Mabsut. Yet again, it is a disagreement on the interpretation of facts, not on the legislative presumption. God knows best. Section Two: Methodology for Extending the Law to New Cases: A major trend among the contemporary scholars of Islamic law is that they mix up the opinions of the jurists belonging to the various schools, practicing a kind of talf┘q or "conflation". 63 This section will first identify a few serious problems in this approach, after which it will describe the methodology of takhr┘j or reasoning by principles for extending the law to new cases.
Problems in Conflation:
The first problem to be discussed with conflation is that it can result in the formation of an opinion which goes against the consensus of the jurists. For instance, some scholars found an opinion of some of the M┐liki scholars that the offence of sexual violence was covered by the concept of ╒ir┐bah; they then opted for I╖l┐╒i's opinion that rajm was the punishment for the worst form of ╒ir┐bah; 64 finally, after combining both these positions they concluded that the rajm was the punishment for zin┐ bil jabr! 65 This conclusion goes against the consensus of all jurists that rajm is the punishment for zin┐, not for ╒irabah. 66 Even those M┐liki jurists who bring sexual violence under the rubric of ╒ir┐bah do not consider rajm as the punishment of ╒ir┐bah. More importantly for our purpose here, such haphazard selection of opinions of the various schools breeds analytical inconsistencies within the system. For instance, Ab┴ ╓an┘fah, after having considered the various sources of Islamic law came up with the principle that Muslim courts could enforce Islamic law only within the territorial limits of Muslim territory, thus recognizing the principle of 'territorial jurisdiction'. 67 Having accepted this principle, he applied it to all the relevant cases of law. Sh┐fi'i takes the opposite view as he rejects the principle of territoriality. Now, if someone were to accept this principle in one instance and reject it in another, it would lead to analytical inconsistency. Hence, following a particular school of law is not "academic parochialism," but the necessary corollary of integrity, which is the most important virtue for any jurist or judge. Some people point out that new cases require new principles. This may be true but this does not mean that the already established law should be undone. Demolishing the already existing legal edifice and build an altogether new structure for addressing newer problems is futile, since the requirement of following a particular set of principle would remain. Hence, even if these scholars are allowed to come up with new principles, these may be deemed -at the most -as constituting new schools of law. The question then would be: why reinvent the wheel? 68 The ╓anafi jurists have devised the methodology of takhr┘j 69 for extending the law to new cases without undoing the existing law. Some significant features of this methodology will be highlighted below.
Determining the Official Position of the School:
The basic tenet of the methodology of takhr┘j is that the jurist must not deviate from the established norms of the School and, as such, they must always follow the preferred opinion (╘┐hir al-madhhab) of the School. 70 The School must always have one preferred opinion, which becomes its official position, so to speak. Other opinions within the School are nonexistent for the followers of the School not qualified for the status of the mujtahid. 71 Hence, it is incumbent upon the jurist to first find out the official position of the School on the various issues that relate to the case at bar. For this purpose, two important points need consideration. First, the School has a particular division and grading of the jurists. 72 Most important among them are the first three grades of the mujtahid┴n, namely, the mujtahid mu═laq, the mujtahid f┘ al-madhhab and the mujtahid f┘ al-mas┐'il. In the first of these categories, the School recognizes only one jurist -Ab┴ ╓an┘fah, the founder. It was him who chalked out the basic structure of the legal theory of the School, even if some of the details were provided by his disciples. Thus, he identified the sources of law, elaborated their relationship with each other, made a priority order among them, formulated the fundamental principles of interpretation and thus provided the legislative presumptions of the School. 73 He also derived rules for thousands of cases on the basis of this methodology. Jurists of the second category, the mujtahid┘n fi al-madhhab, accepted the legislative presumptions of the School and then derived rules for numerous cases. Ab┴ Y┴suf and Shayb┐ni belonged to this category. 74 Many a times they disagreed with the founder of the School on the interpretation of facts, which is why they have disagreed on the rules for particular cases, while being in complete agreement regarding legislative presumptions. The School sometimes accepted the position of the disciples of the Imam and abandoned the view of the Imam. 75 Hence, one has to distinguish between the opinion of Ab┴ ╓an┘fah and the official position of the Hanafi School on an issue, as the two may not necessarily coincide. 76 It is equally true, however, that in the final analysis, the opinions of the disciples are based on the opinion of the Imam because they accept and apply the legal theory which he expounded. 77 Jurists of the third category, mujtahid┘n fi al-mas┐'il -such as al-║a╒┐wi, al-Dabb┴si, al-Karkhi, al-Ja╖╖┐╖ and al-Sarakhsi -are bound by the decisions of the cases settled by the jurists of the first two categories. 78 In case of difference of opinion in the jurists of the first two categories, these mujtahid┘n fi al-mas┐'il may determine the official position of the School after a thorough analysis of the principles and manuals of the School. 79 Finally, they extend the law to new cases using the established principles of the School. 80 The work of all these three categories of the mujtahid┴n forms the binding source for the a╖╒┐b al-takhr┘j, who are not mujtahid┴n but who extend the law to new cases using the established principles of the School. 81 Jurists in the category of a╖╒┐b al-tarj┘╒, those who are skilled in finding the preferred opinion of the School, also exercise takhr┘j for some new cases. 82 The major difference between the jurists categorized as mujtahid┘n fi al-mas┐'il and those termed as a╖╒┐ al-takhr┘j and a╖╒┐b al-tarj┘╒ (or even a╖╒┐b al-fat┐w┐) is that jurists of these latter categories are not deemed mujtahid┴n; otherwise, they all extend the law to new cases through the methodology of takhr┘j. 83 This difference, in practical terms, means that the work of the mujtahid jurist is a binding source for the non-mujtahid jurist (called faq┘h by Nyazee). 84 This hierarchy of the jurists is the cornerstone of the methodology of takhr┘j.
Another important tenet is the strict observance of a hierarchy of manuals that record the decisions of the jurists of the School on various issues. The ╘┐hir al-riw┐yah is placed on the top of the hierarchy. 85 This is the title given to the six texts composed by Shayb┐ni. 86 The decisions of the cases recorded in these books definitively represent the official position of the School. Even in these books, one occasionally finds differences of opinion among the jurists of the School -mostly between the Im┐m and his Two Disciples. However, two of these books, namely, al-Siyar al-╗agh┘r and al-J┐mi' al-╗agh┘r, record the preferred opinion of the School. Nyazee deems them the prototype of the mukhta╖ar┐t or the mut┴n of the School -manuals that record the official position of the School on the cases listed therein. 87 Among these mukhta╖ar┐t, an earlier example is that of 88 These mut┴n were then explained with the help of authoritative commentaries by jurists of high caliber. For instance, Sarakhsi, who was among the mujtahid┘n fi al-mas┐'il, dictated a thirty-volume commentary on al-K┐fi under the title of al-Mabs┴═, which till date continues to be the most authoritative text on Islamic law. 89 Similarly, Margh┘n┐ni himself wrote two commentaries on Bid┐yat al-Mubtad┘. The detailed one is titled Kif┐yat al-Muntah┘, and the brief one is called al-Hid┐yah. It is this later work which captured the jurists of the ╓anafi School of the following generations who wrote detailed commentaries (shur┴╒) on it. 90 Later, glosses, or ╒aw┐shi, were written on these shur┴╒. 91 It is well-established that the matn has priority over the shar╒, and shar╒ has priority over the ╒┐shiyhah. Yet another category of manuals is titled fat┐w┐, such as the al-Fat┐w┐ al-Hindiyyah and Fat┐w┐ Q┐╔┘kh┐n. 92 All these manuals have a priority order and a hierarchical structure. As jurist of a lower category cannot override a jurist of a higher category, the same is true of the manuals of the various categories. 93 2.3 Reasoning from Principles: Nyazee identifies three tasks 94 for the faq┘h or the jurist who, without deviating from the already settled cases, extends the law to new cases on the basis of the established principles of the School: 1. Follow the "precedents" 95 of the Elders of the School; 96 2. Extend the law to new cases on the basis of the established principles; and 3. Where necessary, formulate a "new principle" which is compatible with the already established norms of the School. 97 As far as the "sources" for the faq┘h are concerned, Nyazee mentions two things: 98 1. The manuals of the School, particularly those compiled by the mujtahid┴n of the School; 2. The established principles of the School. The manuals of the School and their hierarchy have already been described above. Details about the principles of the School are discussed below.
As noted earlier, some principles have been explicitly stated in the texts of the Qur'┐n and the Sunnah, while others have been derived by the jurists of the School. Moreover, principles of this latter category may have been strengthened by the opinion of a Companion or the tacit consensus of the earlier generations. For these principles, scholars generally refer to the works titled al-Ashb┐h wa 'l-Na╘┐'ir. 99 However, Ibn '└bid┘n points out that these works must be 'handled with care,' and that the principles, along with their restrictions and exemptions, if any, must be checked from the proper manuals of the School. 100 The compilation of the principles by al-Karkhi and al-Dabb┴si are a rich source for this purpose. 101 Sarakhsi's al-Mabs┴═ is not only a treasure-trove of principles, but also explains how the principles are derived and then used for extending the law to new cases. 102 As for formulating a new principle for novel cases, it is permitted on the condition that the new principle is compatible with the system. This, in essence, necessitates three tests: 1. That the new principle does not alter the implications of the texts of the Qur'┐n and the Sunnah; 103 2. That the new principle does not go against the already established principles of the School; and 3. That there is some positive evidence within the system in favor of the new principle that indicates that it is not altogether 'stranger' to the system. This discussion may be concluded with the following quote from Nyazee:
It should not be assumed that the faq┘h cannot approach… the sources for the mujtahid [the Qur'┐n and the Sunnah]. He certainly can, but the system erected by the fuqah┐' appears to be saying that there is no need to reinvent the wheel. The entire law, after analytical systematization, has been organized around a large body of principles, precedents and rules. This body… provides enough flexibility for expansion and change. So why go through the whole process once again, a process over which centuries of labor has been expended by the mujtahid? Why not build on the work that has been done already? Why lose the heritage? 104
Conclusion:
This analysis of the legal theory of the ╓anafi School shows that the doctrine of taql┘d was developed for the purpose of ensuring analytical consistency in the legal theory. It also shows that the most important aspect of the ╓anafi legal theory is the use of the general principles of law which not only helps in ensuring analytical consistency in the legal system but also in extending the law to new cases by using the methodology of takhr┘j. For instance, if one is can be restricted by the other, the conflict is resolved. U╖┴l al-Sarakhsi, 2:18. Thus, the ╓anafi School does not apply the verse about cutting of hand (Q 5:38) to the alien non-Muslim who commits theft after entering into the Muslim territory with the permission of the Muslim authority (musta'min) as they restrict this verse by Q 9:6 which commands Muslims to refrain from any hostile act against such a person. 36 For instance, Q 2:225 declares that a person will be held liable if he intentionally takes an oath and this includes a false oath for asserting or denying an act done in past (yam┘n gham┴s), while Q 5:89 prescribes expiation only for the breaking oaths taken for doing or omitting an act in future (yam┘n ma'q┴dah). The ╓anafi School distinguishes between the 'liability' mentioned in these verses by asserting that Q 2:225 prescribes liability in the hereafter, while Q 5:89 prescribes the worldly expiation. U╖┴l al-Sarakhsi, 2:19. 37 Ibid., 2:19-20. 38 Ibid., 2:20. 39 Ibid., 2:20-21. 40 This final situation is only hypothetical, as many jurists assert.
